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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN D. HAYWARD and 
CLARENCE D. EV ANS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
vs. 
FRANK PENNOCK, LESLIE B. 
WHITE, and JOSEPH MAZURAN, 
as Chairman and Members of the 
Salt Lake County Merit Service 
Commission, respectively, Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Department, 
Defendants-Appellants 
CASE NO. 
176216 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in the nature of injunction or extra-
ordinary relief brought by Norman D. Hayward and Clar-
ence D. Evans, Lieutenants in the Office of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff, who, by a Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
(R. 1-3), sought to invalidate a Captains' Examination 
given by the defendants who individually comprise the Salt 
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Lake County Merit Service Commission, claiming the same 
to be contrary to and beyond the authority conferred by 
Chapter 30 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated (The Merit 
System Statute) . 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
The matter was tried before the Third Judicial District 
Court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson presiding, on December 
12, 1967. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision 
December 13, 1967, amended the same December 14, 1967 
(R. 12, 13), and executed its formal Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment December 15, 1967 (R. 
14-18). Said Findings, Conclusions and Judgment invalidat-
ed said Captains' Examination (which was administered 
by the defendants, incidentally, on September 9, 1967) and 
held the same to be null and void and further ordered the 
defendants to vacate the eligibility register resulting from 
said examination (R. 14). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants contend that such Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment were in error and accordingly 
filed their Notice of Appeal December 20, 1967 (R. 19), and 
seek a reversal of the lower court's action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of trial there was admitted into evidence by 
the stipulation of the parties the Rules and Regulations of 
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the Merit Commission (Exhibit P-1), Minutes of the Com-
mission's meeting held July 27, 1967 (Exhibit P-2), Minutes 
of the meeting of the Commission held August 31, 1967 
(Exhibit P-3) Minutes of the meeting of the Commission 
held September 14, 1967 (Exhibit P-4), a letter of the Com-
mission to Sheriff Larson dated August 7, 1967 (Exhibit 
P-5), and a letter from the Commission to Sheriff Larson 
dated September 29, 1967 (Exhibit P-6). Testimony was re-
ceived from Frank M. Pennock, Commission Chairman, 
Joseph Mazuran, a Commissioner, Donald Sawaya, a Deputy 
County Attorney, and Donald S. Tingley, Deputy County 
Clerk. A number of other exhibits were thereafter received 
in the course of the testimony, some of which will be more 
specifically alluded to hereinafter. 
The Captains' Examination conducted by the defend-
ants-appellants, who will hereinafter be referred to col-
lectively as the Commission, was attacked by plaintiffs-
respondents on three grounds which will be discussed in 
some detail in the Argument hereinafter. There were, in 
addition to the plaintiffs-respondents, four other candidates 
who were given the Captains' Examination on September 9, 
1967. Plaintiffs-Respondents failed to pass said written 
examination (R. 45). The other four candidates, Arthur E. 
Allen, Paul E. LaBounty, Larry J. Dow and Karl Ehlers, 
passed the written examination and were placed on the 
Captains' Register from which the Sheriff could make pro-
motions to the rank of captain (Exhibit P-6). 
At the time of the written examination, which consisted 
of 190 questions (R. 31), the candidates were orally in-
formed that in order to pass the same they would need a 
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score of 143 correct answers to the 190 questions, which 
constitutes 75% of the examination (R. 32). Mr. Pennock 
was interrogated at some length at the trial about the ratio 
of the written examination to the oral interview of the 
candidates by the Commission, the in-time service of the 
candidates, and the merit rating given each candidate by 
the Sheriff ( R. 31-36, R. 48-51, Exhibit P-3), which will be 
referred to in detail in the Argument hereinafter. 
The remaining matters of fact relate to Minutes of 
meetings of the Commission, notices or requirements there-
for, etc., which will be discussed in relevant detail in the 
course of the Argument. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
RELIEF PRAYED BY PLAINTIFFS-RESPON-
DENTS, THERE BEING NO SHOWING AT THE 
TRIAL AN EXCEEDING OF STATUTORY AU. 
THORITY, ABUSE OF DISCRETION, FRAUD, 
COLLUSION, LACK OF GOOD FAITH OR CAPRI· 
CIOUSNESS ON THE PART OF THE DEFEN-
DANTS-APPELLANTS. 
Chapter 30 of Title 17 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
hereinafter referred to as the Merit Act, from which the 
Commission derives its authority and powers, has never 
been construed in whole or part by this Court. It is axiomat· 
ic, however, that any Merit Service Commission exercises 
only its statutory powers and must find within its enabling 
language whatever warrant it has for any authority it claims 
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and further has only such powers as are expressly granted 
it by statute or necessarily implied. People ex rel Polan vs. 
Roehler, 405 Ill. 322, 90 NE 2d 729. Stauffer vs. San An-
tonio, 162 Tex. 13, 344 SW 2d 158. Rules adopted, therefore, 
by a commission must be consistent with and not in excess 
of said authority or constitutional grant. Hale vs. Worstell, 
185 N.Y. 241, 77 NE 1177. 
This Court has often reaffirmed the rule that the ju-
dicial branch of government will not interfere with discre-
tionary acts of administrative agencies or commissions 
absent the showing of fraud, collusion, capriciousness, etc. 
A recent example is Clayton vs. Salt Lake City, (1963) 15 
Utah 2d 57, 387 P. 2d 93, where the court said, through 
Justice Crockett : 
"The court is reluctant to interfere with the admin-
istrative function and would do so only if facts were 
shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud, collusion or 
lack of good faith in perf0rming the duty mentioned. 
That is not demonstrated here." 
With that general foundational law, at the outset it is 
observed that plaintiffs-respondents attacked the validity 
of the September 9, 1967 examination on three grounds. 
(The Complaint itemizes four (R. 1, 2), two of which, how-
ever, deal with the matter of notice and will herein be con-
sidered singly). They were ( 1) that candidates then 
ineligible to take said examination were allowed to be tested; 
(2) that the notice from the written examination did not 
comply with what plaintiffs-respondents contended were 
statutory requirements, both as to requiring publishing no-
tice of the examination and as to the announcement of min-
imum passing grade: and (3) that following the written 
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examination and plaintiffs-respondents failing to pass the 
same, plaintiffs-respondents were not further processed by 
the Commi:;;sion, and the Commission allegedly failed tii 
accredit plaintiffs-respondents properly for time in service, 
merit rating and oral interview, as plaintiffs-responden~ 
contend the Merit Act requires the Commission to do. 
With regard to the first challenge, the record is clear 
that at Page 6 of Exhibit P-1, the Rules and Regulations of 
the Commission adopted July 27, 1967, the Commission 
provided: "All merit officers who have served an in-rank 
term of not less than three ( 3) years shall be eligible to take 
the competitive examination for the next promotional rank 
above their present status." From the Minutes of the meet 
ing held July 27, 1967 (P-2) where said Rules and Regula-
tions were adopted by the Commission, discussion was had 
about.the above quoted sentence. The Minutes read: 
"Discussion was had relative to Rule 3-Examinations 
and Subdivision 3.02(b)1 which provides that any 
candidate for an examination have served in rank 
for a term or not less than three years. It was agreed 
that said rule ought to be part of the permanent 
rules, but that inasmuch as the last examination 
waived that requirement, and inasmuch as there was 
an immediate need to fill vacancies on the captain 
and lieutenant level, .md a new examination at either 
level may shortly be needed, it was accordingly pro· 
posed by Commissioner Mazuran, seconded by Dr. 
White an unanimously passed that on the forthcom· 
ing captain's examination this three years in-rank 
requirement would again be waived." 
Exhibits P-7 through P-17, together with the support· 
ing testimony of Deputy County Clerk Donald S. Tingley, 
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makes it reasonably clear that Lieutenants Karl Ehlers and 
Paul LaBounty had not served in the rank of lieutenant for 
three full years prior to September 9, 1967. The court below, 
in its Memorandum Decision, as amended in paragraph 
three ( R. 12) and in the Findings of Fact, paragraph 6 
(R. 17), concluded that the above noted waiver of the 
three-yea ... in-rank requirement was void and that only the 
Rules and Regulations were applicable. Defendants-Appell-
ants herein maintain that ruling was error. The controlling 
case in point appears to be Weiss vs. Keefer, (1914), 3 Ohio 
App. 426, 20 Ohio CCNS, 366, 36 Ohio CC 204. In that case 
a Corporal in the Police Department was allowed to take a 
promotional examination for Sergeant though he had served 
less than the minimum two years required by the Civil 
Service Commission's Rules. The Ohio Court of Appeals 
ruled that such in-service requirement, having been created 
by the Civil Service Commission in its Rules, it could be 
waived by the Commission. The pertinent language of the 
opinion reads as follows : 
"We are of the opinion that the Civil Service Com-
mission had the power to so waive or suspend this 
rule, that its action in making all the corporals then 
on the force eligible to this examination was within 
its power, that the examination was within its power, 
and that the examination was held according to law; 
nor was it necessary to note on its minutes that a 
rule had been suspended, there being no objection on 
the part of any member, and all members being 
present." (The "members" referred to in the opinion 
refer to the membership of the Civil Service 
Commission.) 
As noted above, the evidence is clear that the unani-
mous intent and purpose of the Commission was to waive 
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the three-year in-service requirement. There is nothing in 
the Merit Act or the Commission's Rules and Regulations 
that prevents it from so waiving or suspending a given rule. 
Indeed, the Merit Act provides at 17-30-23: " ... it shall be 
the duty of the Merit Service Commission to provide by rule 
for the operation and functioning of any activity within the 
purpose and spirit of the act which may be or may become 
necessary and proper and which is not specifically provided 
hereby." There being no showing in the Court below that 
the waiver of the rule herein was in bad faith, capricious, 
fraudulant, etc., the Trial Court should not have intruded 
into the exercise of discretion by the Commission and set it 
aside. 
With regard to the second contention advanced by 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, they maintain that the notice of the 
September 9, 1967 examination did not conform to the Merit 
Act requirements in two particulars: ( :1.) That the notice 
was not published in a paper of general circulation within 
the county; and (2) that the notice did not specify the pass-
ing grade. In the Court below Plaintiffs-Respondents relied 
upon the provision of Section 17-30-6 ( 2) which provides: 
"Notice of examination shall be published one time 
not less than 15 days prior to the examination in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the area con-
cerned and shall be posted in a conspicuous place in 
the office of the department concerned. The notice 
shall set forth minimum and maximum wages, phy-
sical and educational requirements and passing 
grades, which shall not be less than 70% ... " 
It is to be noted, however, that this Section begins with the 
following language : 
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"At such time as may be necessary, the Commission 
shall conduct open competitive examinations to de-
termine the qualification of applicants for positions 
as peace officers . .. ' (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear, from a reading of the Section as a whole, that it 
relates to original competitive examinations open to the 
public for beginning peace officers newly recruited into the 
Sheriff's employ. This interpretation is further re-enforced 
by the provisions of Section 17 -30-12 (2) relating to vacan-
cies occurring within the system and promotions and 
provides: 
"Vacancies occurring in the Merit System classifica-
tion of ::my county shall be filled by promotion in so 
far as possible. A promotion shall be made only after 
open competitive examination, admission to which 
shall be limited to Merit System officers . .. " (Em-
phasis added.) 
This section relating to promotional examinations limited to 
Merit System officers contains no language prescribing no-
tice or what form such notice, if any, should take, nor what 
items should be therein included. The Merit Commission's 
Rules (Exhibit P-1) provide under Rule 3, pages 5-7, for 
examinations and specify, at Rule 3.02, two types of examin-
ation: (a) For the applicants for the office of deputy; and 
(b) for promotional or in-rank examinations. At Rule 
3.02(b)2, it reads: 
"Notice of such in-rank examinations shall by letter 
be transmitted by the Commission to the Sheriff, 
and the Sheriff shall transmit said notice by posting 
or letter or otherwise, whichever is best calculated 
to give actual notice to the eligible officers, in writ-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
ing, that a competitive examination is to be given. 
Said notice shall be given not less than thirty (30) 
days prior to the date on which the examination is 
to be given." 
In connection with the Captain's Examination in issue, 
notice was transmitted te Sher!ff Larson by letter (Exhibit 
P-5) dated August 7, 1967 as follows: 
"In that connection, you are hereby notified, pursu-
ant to the rules and regulations of this Commission, 
that an in-rank examination for the position of Cap-
tain will be given by this Commission on Saturday, 
September 9, 1967, at a place and time the Commis-
sion will designate. The examination will be taken 
from, but not limited to, the Utah Code, the Rules 
and Regulations of the Salt Lake County Merit Serv-
ice Commission, the current Red Cross Manual, the 
traffic code of Salt Lake County and the State of 
Utah and related questions on law enforcement and 
additional questions concerned with responsibilities 
of command." 
Plaintiffs-Respondents asserted no claim in the Court 
below and there is no• evidence to the effect that eligible 
candidates or otherwise failed to receive appropriate notice, 
nor that any of them complained at the time of the giving 
of the test that they were prejudiced by not being informed 
previously what the passing grade for the examination 
would be. On the contrary, Plaintiffs-Respondents and all 
other eligible lieutenants (including the two Plaintiffs- Re-
spondents contend were ineligible) appeared at the appro-
priate time and place and were examined. 
This situation seems analogous to that in the case of 
Almassy vs. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, 
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(1949) 34 C. 2nd 387, 210 P. 2nd 503, 514. In that case the 
Appellant sought to invalidate two promotional Civil Service 
examinations because of an evaluation technique employed 
by the Commission using a "general qualifications apprisal 
record" relating to voice, speech, judgment, poise and other 
general personality traits arrived at through oral interview 
by examiners. Appellant contended these appraisals did not 
constitute "open competitive examination" as required by 
the State and the Commission's Rules. The Court there said: 
"In determining the problem of the validity of the 
two promotional civil service examinations here in 
question, it must be remembered that petitioner does 
not claim that there was any arbitrary, fraudulent, 
or capricious action on the part of the commission, 
or any person acting on its behalf, in the conduct of 
the examinations, but confines his objections solely 
to the propriety of the method of procedure adopted 
by the commission for testing the candidates. In 
view of the conclusion that the examinations as pre-
scribed by the commission were appropriate to the 
competitive selection of civil service personnel, and 
in the absence of any charge or showing that the 
commission, or anyone acting in this matter, pro-
ceeded otherwise than honestly and in good faith in 
the evaluation process, petitioner cannot prevail in 
this mandamus proceeding." (Emphasis added.) 
Again, the notice requirements for promotional exam-
inations restricted to Merit System officers clearly should 
be different than an open competitive examination to the 
public for incoming deputies. The Rules of the Commission, 
the notice actually given, seem reasonable and well within 
the omnibus authority given the Commission to "provide by 
rule" for its operations and functions under the Merit Act. 
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It was accordingly error, therefore, for the Trial Court to 
impose the duty of published notice and providing therein 
the passing grade. 
As to Plaintiffs-Respondents third and final contention, 
they maintain that the fad that the Commission failed to 
consider their time in service, their merit rating, and re. 
fused to further process them with a physical examination 
and oral interview prejudiced their interest and was con. 
trary to the mandatory language of Section 17-30-12 (2). 
The relevant language therein provides : 
"Such examination shall include an average of serv-
ice ratings for the next preceding year, a rating of 
seniority, and test the competence of the peace offi. 
cer to perform the duty required in the position for 
which application is made. The combined weights of 
service rating and seniority shall be not more than 
40% of the whole examination." 
The issue here, therefore, is another of the Rules of the 
Commission, or rather parts of two Rules. They are as 
follows: (Exhibit P-1, p. 6) Rule 3.02 (b) 4: 
"4. Upon passing said written examination, candi· 
dates will be further rated by the Com.mission as 
follows: 
The written examination shall constitute sixty per 
cent ( 60%) of the rating; personal interview with 
the Commission, twenty per cent (20%); merit rat-
ing, fifteen (15%) and seniority, five per cent (5%). 
5. All candidates in addition to the above examina-
tions must meet the physical and agility require-
ments promulgated by the Commission. 
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8.03 Minimum Grades. The Commission may de-
termine a minimum grade for all or any part or parts 
of the examinations as provided for above. Any ap-
plicant who fails to meet the minimum grade set by 
the Commission shall be considered as failed the ex-
amination and his application shall not be further 
processed and he shall be so notified." 
It is further provided in the Minutes of the Merit Commis-
sion of its meeting August 31, 1967 (Exhibit P-3) as 
follows: 
"It was proposed by the Chairman and unanimously 
carried by the Commission in accordance with the 
earlier discussion of this Commission that there 
would be approximately 200 questions, and that a 
passing grade would need to be 753. The written 
test would constitute 603 of the total rating; the 
merit rating, time in service and oral interview 
would constitute the remaining 403. Any candidate 
failing to pass the written examination would be pro-
cessed no further. It was further proposed l:ly the 
Chairman, seconded by Dr. White and unanimonsly 
carried that those candidates who were further pro-
cessed, having passed the written examination, 
would be required to receive at least 363 of the pos-
sible 403 in order to be placed on the eligibility 
register." 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, Chairman Pennock 
was interrogated in detail about the written examination, 
the percentage of the overall rating that examination bore 
in ratio to the oral interview, in service time and merit 
rating. On cross examination by his own counsel, Mr. Pen-
nock further indicated that not only did Plaintiffs-Respon-
dents fail the written examination, but that they were pro-
cessed no further (R. 44, 45). He was asked if he had 
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in his possession the individual records of Plaintiffs-Respon. 
dents and replied in the affirmative; he was then asked if 
in the files there appeared both the years in service for 
Plaintiffs-Respondents and their individual merit ratings, 
and he responded that such were in the files (R. 45). 
He was then asked : 
"Q. Assuming, Mr. Pennock, that an oral interview 
had been given, which, as I understand it, would be 
your final element with regard to further processing, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Assuming that such an interview had been given 
in each of the instances of the plaintiffs herein and 
they had received the maximum number of points, 
which I believe you testified was 20, is that correct1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then in that event, apart from their failing or 
passing the written test, would the plaintiffs have 
been eligible, without again giving any numbers, to 
have been placed on an eligibility roster for captain1 
MR. McRAE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Let's make the record. The objection 
will be noted. Go ahead. 
A. No." (R. 45-6). 
When questioned as to why the Commission adopted the 
policy of not further processing candidates who failed the 
written portion of the examination, Mr. Pennock said: 
"A. The Salt Lake County Commission has given the 
Merit Commission a rather limited budget, and with 
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this thought in mind if we had continued to process 
everyone who took the examinations I don't believe 
that we would have had the finances to do it. 
Q. What finances are needed with regard to further 
processing? 
A. Medical examinations. They had to be part of 
this. So would much time in personal interviewing, 
and we felt this was extremely important and want-
ed to be sure the interview was meaningful to the 
men that took it, and it was just a matter of plain 
economics. 
Q. Those were considerations that lead to the adop-
tion of that specific rule, 3.03? 
A. Basically, yes." (R. 60-61). 
The ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court in a cei,ae 
of remarkable similarity seems pertinent here. It is Zicher-
man vs. Departmwt of Civil Service, (1963) 40 N.J. 347, 
192 A. 2d 566. In that case an examination was given by the 
Department of Civil Service for the Clerk of the District 
Court of Essex County. The test included a written and an 
oral portion. The appellant took the examination with three 
others. Two of the four passed the written portion. The 
Statement of Facts in the opinion continues as follows: 
"Two of the applicants achieved a passing score on 
the written test. The other two, including the appel-
lant, failed to achieve a score of 70% on the written 
test and, in accordance with civil service practice, 
were excluded from further participation in the 
examination." 
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The appellant thereafter claimed the examination was irn. 
proper both as to the manner in which it was given, that the 
questions bore no relationship to the duties of the clerk, and 
that he was prejudiced in not being given the oral portion 
of the examination in order to demonstrate his knowledge 
and nkill and ability to discharge the duties of clerk The 
Court there ruled : 
"The preparation and administration of civil service 
examinations is an administrative function 'delegat 
ed most liberally to the authorized examiners of the 
Department (of Civil Service) by the Legislature.' 
Artaser:w vs. Dept. of Ciuil Service, 37 N.J. Super. 
98, 105, 117 A. 2d 22, 26 (App. Div. 1955). The fuJ. 
f1llment of that function is a matter requiring spe. 
cial expertise, involving as it does the determination 
of what job knowledge, skills and abilities are neces· 
sary or desirable in a candidate for a particular 
position, and the highly technical problem of devis-
ing suitable examina~<ion questions which will dern· 
onstrate as accurately as possible whether an 
applicant possesses those requirements sufficiently 
to qualify for the position. See Brotspies v. Dept. oj 
Civil Service, N.J. 66 N.J. Super. 492, 496-498, rn 
A. 2d 484 (App. Div. 1961). 
In view of the above, the courts cannot intervene to 
nullify a civil se:rvice examination unless it is clearli 
shown that the Department has abused its discretion. 
See Planagan ·v. Civil Service Department, 29 N.J. l 
12, 148 A. 2d 14, 20 (1959), where this court said: 
'It is important to the efficient functioning of th< 
public service employment program that ' ( c) ourtf 
should let administrative boards and officers worl 
out their problems with as little judicial interfer· 
ence as possible. They may decide a particular 
question wrong--but it is their question. (The! 
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are) vested with a high discretion and its abuse 
must appear very clearly before the courts will 
interfere.' Maxwell v. Civ'il Service Commission, 
169 Cal. 336, 146 P. 869, 871 (Sup. Ct. 1915). If 
there is any fair argument in support of the 
course taken or any reasonable ground for differ-
ence of opinion among intelligent and conscien-
tious officials, the decision is conclusively legisla-
tive, and will not be disturbed unless patently 
corrupt, arbitrary or illegal. Doubts held by the 
court as to the wisdom of the administrator's de-
cision do not alter the case.' 
See also, Kelly v. Ci11il Service Com., 37 N.J. 450, 460, 
181 A. 2d 745 (1962); Brotspies v. Dept. of Civil 
Service, N.J. 72 N.J. Super. 334, 342, 178 A. 2d 367 
(App. Div. 1962) ; Artaserse v. Dept. of Civil Serv-
ice, Supra, 37 N.J. Super., at p. 105, 117 A. 2d, at p. 
26." 
Also of importance is the language in a similar opinion 
from the District Court of Appeals of California in the case 
of Amerio vs. City and County of San Francisco, (1954) 
126 Cal. App. 2d 359, 271 P. 2d 996: 
"We are satisfied that the facts disclosed by this evi-
dence furnish a reasonable basis for the determina-
tion of the Civil Service Commission and: 'Where 
the position is one as to the proper mode of filling 
which there is fair and reasonable ground for dif-
ference of opinion among intelligent and conscien-
tious officials, the action of the commission should 
stand, even though the courts may differ from the 
commission as to the wisdom of the classification.' 
Pratt v. Rosenthal, 181 Cal. 158, 163-164, 183 P. 542, 
544.'' 
Since the Statute in question requires that the written 
portion of an examination constitute at least 60% of the 
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overall rating, is a regulation or policy of a testing com.mis. 
sion, per se, invalid if it requires that a candidate must firs! 
pass that written portion before being allowed other factors 
to figure into his overall grade'? Clearly, that determination 
is a matter of discretion with the Commission. Clearly, fur. 
ther, such a ruling hardly appears capricious, fraudulen! 
or otherwise irrational as to justify judicial interference. 
Holding that the examination sD.ould be stricken as null and 
void "for failing to inc>Jde in said test all of the items spe. 
cified by Statute" (R. 14) is another interference on the 
part of the Court with the proper exercise of discretion by 
the Commission which this Court should reverse. 
Giving the Plaintiffs-Respondents the maximum digni. 
ty affordable to their position and assuming that this refusal 
to process them having failed the written examination wa~ 
ultra vires and contrary to statutory mandate, then, 
in that event, at worst, ·the Commission should have been 
ordered by the District Court below to further process these 
candidates. It should not have ordered the test to be nullified. 
The rights of the other candidates who successfully 
passed the written portion of the examination should equally 
be considered by the Court. It is t0 be borne in mind as well 
that the written examination itself, the questions, the con· 
tent, the manner in which it was given, are not contPsted by 
Plaintiffs-Respondents and should, accordingly, remain in 
full force and effect together with the eligibility register 
derived therefrom. As noted above, however, even had tht 
Plaintiffs-Respondents been further processed and bee1 
given the maximum available points from the other areas oi 
merit rating, oral interview and service time, even in thal 
event they would have been ineligible to be placed on such a 
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register. These being the facts, invalidating the test is the 
more prejudicial to those other candidates who in good faith 
took and passed the examination. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants-Appellants submit 
that the Trial Court erred in granting the Plaintiffs-Respon-
dents the relief prayed below, and said judgment in its 
entirety should accordingly be reversed with instructions to 
dismiss Plaintiffs-Respondents' complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Appellants 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
RONNOW, MADSEN & TANNER 
57 4 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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